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RESOLVING CONFLICTS OF JURISDICTION 
IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS: 
INTERPRETING NE BIS IN IDEM IN 




Th e manner of establishing criminal jurisdiction by domestic courts of competent 
criminal jurisdiction presents the most important aspect of the relation between states 
and international tribunals. Th e analyses of the jurisprudence of international courts 
and tribunals pertaining to the principle ne bis in idem has resulted in the conclusion 
that this principle can be fully understood and applied in conjunction with the principle 
of complementarity.
Keywords: ne bis in idem; complementarity; double jeopardy; positive/negative 
confl icts of criminal jurisdiction; transnational crimes
1. INTRODUCTION
Criminal law is one of the most rapidly changing areas of EU law and integration 
between Member States, and has been elevated to a central place in the European 
Constitution by the Treaty of Lisbon within the dynamic area of freedom, security 
and justice.1 In consequence of the extended scope and extraterritorial reach of 
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1 See Klip (ed.), Substantive Criminal Law of the European Union (Maklu Publishers, 2011); Fletcher, 
Loof and Gilmore, EU Criminal Law and Justice (Elgar, 2010); Mitsilegas, EU Criminal Law (Hart, 




national legal systems and technological advancements, national criminal justice 
systems are becoming increasingly confronted with the dilemma where several 
countries might have jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute the same or substantially 
the same crime. In circumstances where several states might establish prosecutorial 
jurisdiction for the same crime, or facts and circumstances pertaining to the planning 
and commission of the crime, this state of aff airs possibly will bring about positive 
confl icts of jurisdiction when two or more states assert criminal jurisdiction.2 
Conversely negative confl icts of jurisdiction might arise when none of the states 
concerned is willing to investigate and prosecute the perpetrators3 and vindicate the 
rights of victims.4
Th e article examines the body of case law on the ne bis in idem principle concerning 
the substance, rationale, scope, elements of, as well as the exceptions to, the procedural 
defence.5 It posits that the principles of ne bis in idem and complementarity requires 
the EU legislator to lay down defi nitive rules to resolve confl icts of jurisdictions in 
criminal matters and necessitates proper guidelines from international courts, 
tribunals and relevant EU level bodies on dispute mechanism procedures while 
respecting due process rights of defendants. Given the promotion of victims rights, 
the aims of conviction and punishment of off enders and same crime dilemma, the 
2 Th e dilemma pertains to situations where the planning and commission of crimes transgress the 
territory of several nation-states, or the eff ects of a crime are impacted in the territory of several 
states, or where serious crimes are being committed in a state but the nationality or place of 
residence of the perpetrators or victims points to another EU Member State.
3 Th e Hague Programme (Th e Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the 
European Union) 2005/C53/01, OJ C 53/1, requires Member States to enact legislation managing 
confl icts of jurisdiction, with the aim of increasing the effi  ciency of prosecutions while guaranteeing 
the proper administration of justice, in order to complete the comprehensive programme of 
measures designed to implement the principle of mutual recognition of judicial decisions in 
criminal matters. Approximation of the criminal laws of Member States will have a signifi cant 
impact on Member States’ legal cultures and traditions and on national sovereignty. Th e Hague 
Programme views such approximation as being necessary only if it facilitates mutual recognition. 
However, the more progress that is made on developing the mutual recognition programme, the 
greater the need will be for a minimum standard across the EU of procedures in the legal processes 
for which mutual recognition will be claimed. Approximation of criminal laws is necessary to not 
only facilitate mutual trust and justify mutual recognition but also to protect the rights of the 
individuals aff ected. See Weyembergh, ‘Approximation of Criminal Laws, the Constitutional Treaty 
and the Hague Programme’ (2005) 42 CML Rev 1567.
4 Th e Stockholm Programme 2010–2014 (An Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protecting Citizens) 
2010/C 115/01, stipulates for an integrated and co-ordinated approach to victims of crime, which 
necessitates the Commission and EU Member States to examine how to improve legislative 
resolution in this area. To reinforce existing national and EU measures on victims’ rights, the 
Commission adopted a package of legislative proposals that a fi rst step towards putting victims at 
the heart of the criminal justice agenda of the EU. See Wieczorek, ‘A Needed Balance between 
Security Liberty and Justice: Positive Signals Arrive from the Field of Victim’s Rights’ (2012) 2 
EuCLR 141; Wieczorek, ‘Th e New Proposal on Victims’ Rights: Law Enforcement Concerns or the 
Safeguard of the Rights of the Individuals?’ (2011) NJECL 343.
5 Cf. Neagu, ‘Th e Ne Bis in Idem Principle in the Interpretation of European Courts: Towards Uniform 
Interpretation’ (2012) 25 Leiden Journal of International Law, 955.
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centrality of the dispute resolution mechanism and the authority of international 
courts, tribunals and EU level bodies the decisive role in dispute resolution mechanism 
over national jurisdictions needs clarifi cation.
2. TRANSNATIONAL CRIMES
Th e membership enlargement of the Council of Europe and EU may inadvertently 
facilitate the potential for transnational crimes, and a corresponding number of 
prosecutorial jurisdictions will inevitably give rise to procedural dilemmas and 
confl icts of jurisdiction in criminal matters.6 While freedom of movement is one of 
the basic aims of EU integration, this in addition to the technological resources 
available to criminals operating on a transnational basis inadvertently facilitates the 
progress of transnational crimes.7 Police and judicial cooperation in the fi ght against 
organised cross-border crime must accordingly adapt to this phenomenon. Law 
enforcement agencies and prosecution authorities must deal with the challenge of 
devising alternative procedures in the investigation and prosecution of off ences that 
extend beyond national borders. With the globalisation of crime, national law 
enforcement agencies are increasingly obliged to cooperate in order to bring criminals 
to justice. Eff ectively combating transnational crime requires national and 
international eff orts including cross-border and international eff orts to eff ectively 
deal with this phenomenon. Cooperative eff orts to combat transnational crime are 
necessary at all stages of the criminal justice process including substantive criminal 
law, policing, courts of justice, prisons and places of detention.8
Transnational crimes generate procedural dilemmas concerning investigation and 
prosecution with sovereignty of nation-states inevitably being the most restrictive 
factor.9 Th ese off ences transcend more than one country in their planning, execution, 
impact, and because of their multinational characteristics, application and scope are 
6 See European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics, 4th ed., 2010, covering the years 
2003–2007 (www.europeansourcebook.org/).
7 Th e right to free movement is one of the basic rights of EU citizens. A common travel area operates 
between Ireland and the UK (including the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man), which means that 
there are no passport controls in operation for Irish and UK citizens travelling between the two 
countries.
8 See Albanese, Transnational Crime and the 21st Century: Criminal Enterprise, Corruption, and 
Opportunity (Oxford University Press, 2011); Obokata, Transnational Organised Crime in 
International Law (Hart, 2010); Madsen, Transnational Organized Crime (Routledge, 2009); Reichel, 
Handbook of Transnational Crime and Justice (Sage, 2005); Campbell, Organised Crime and the 
Law: A Comparative Analysis (Ashgate, 2012).
9 Transnational crimes are transgressions that have actual or potential eff ect across national borders 
and crimes that are intra-State but off end fundamental values of the international community. 
Examples of transnational crimes include human traffi  cking, smuggling and traffi  cking of goods, 
sex slavery, terrorism off ences, torture and apartheid. Transnational organized crime (TOC) refers 
specifi cally to transnational crime carried out by organised criminal organisations. Cf. 
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clearly distinguished from national crimes.10 Th e scale and frequency of transnational 
organised crimes and gross human rights violations creates unique problems as 
regards understanding their causes, developing prevention strategies, and devising 
eff ective negotiation procedures pertaining to jurisdictional confl icts and transfer of 
proceedings in criminal matters.11
Domestic criminal justice systems are facing the ever-increasing globalisation of 
crime. Transnational organised criminal groups are traffi  cking increasing quantities 
of drugs, fi rearms, counterfeit products, stolen natural resources and people, as well 
as smuggling more migrants across borders and engaging in maritime piracy and 
cybercrime. Th e response in many nations has been to expand the extraterritorial 
application and enforcement of domestic criminal laws and to increase mechanisms 
of international cooperation in the areas of extradition, mutual legal assistance and 
information sharing. At the multi-lateral level, a permanent international criminal 
court has been established. Diplomatic resourcefulness will undoubtedly play an 
integral part in deciding claims by multiple jurisdictions in the prosecution of 
transnational crimes.
3. PRINCIPLES OF NE BIS IN IDEM AND 
COMPLEMENTARITY
Th e manner of establishing criminal jurisdiction by nation-states and the commencement 
of criminal proceedings is a sovereign right and an important aspect of diplomatic 
relations between Member States.12 Th e scope and application of the European principle 
ne bis in idem may need clarifi cation in comparison to the principle commonly known 
in the national law of states. Analyses of the jurisprudence emanating from international 
courts and tribunals leads to the conclusion that ne bis in idem can only be fully 
understood, and applied, in conjunction with the principle of complementarity.
Zimmermann, Glaser, and Motz, ‘Mutual Recognition and its Implications for the Gathering of 
Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: a Critical Analysis of the Initiative for a European Investigation 
Order’ (2011) 1 EuCLR 55; Blackstock, ‘Th e European Investigation Order’ (2010) NJECL 481.
10 Although the terms ‘international crime’ and ‘cross-border crime’, oft en referred to as ‘transnational 
crime’ are used interchangeably, these terms can be diff erentiated: ‘transnational’ has the sense of 
transcending borders (almost a borderless idea) whereas ‘international’ retains the concept of 
clearly defi ned borders intact. Moreover, ‘transnational’ describes crimes that are not only 
international (that is, crimes that cross borders between countries), but crimes that by their nature 
involve border crossings as an essential part of the planning and commission of the crime. 
Transnational crimes also include crimes that take place in one state, but their consequences 
signifi cantly aff ect another state. Cf. Boister, ‘Transnational Criminal Law?’ (2003) 14 EJIL 953; 
Passas, ‘Cross-Border Crime and the Interface between Legal and Illegal Actors’ (2003) 16 Security 
Journal, 19.
11 Cf. Ludwiczak, ‘Jurisdiction and Applicable Law in the EU Directive on Transfer of Proceedings in 
Criminal Matters’ (2010) NJECL 343.
12 Cf. Müller-Jacobsen, ‘Supremacy of EU Law in National Criminal Trials’ (2009) NJECL 7.
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3.1. NE BIS IN IDEM
A basic principle of European and international criminal justice and the law of 
national criminal jurisdictions is that a defendant should not be prosecuted or 
punished more than once for the same criminal off ence.13 Th e ne bis in idem principle 
(European equivalent of the common law principle against double jeopardy) means 
that it is prohibited to initiate criminal proceedings or reopen a judgment against the 
same defendant a second time for the same criminal off ence by the prosecution 
authorities or by courts of the same State.14 Th ere is not only a breach of ne bis in idem 
when a defendant is tried or punished twice for nominally the same crime but also 
when a defendant is prosecuted twice for multiple crimes of which the essential 
elements overlap.15 Th e principle is respected by legal systems that are concerned to 
secure protection for fundamental rights.16
Criminal law and procedure inevitably varies according to the law and penal 
procedure of the state with jurisdiction over the prosecution of crimes extending 
beyond national borders.17 Substantive and procedural rights in criminal proceedings 
are enhanced by the principle of ne bis in idem, which is a fundamental right against 
multiple criminal trials or the imposition of multiple punishments (ne bis poena in 
idem) for the same crime. Th e principle is a fundamental constitutional right in civil 
law jurisdictions18 and is respected by international human rights conventions.19 Th e 
13 Mutual recognition is expressed by the ne bis in idem principle, which provides that a person may 
not be tried in another Member State for materially the same facts that have been subject to judicial 
decision in another Member State or which the prosecution has defi nitely disposed. Cf. Mitsilegas, 
‘Th e Constitutional Implications of Mutual Recognition in Criminal Matters in the EU’ (2006) 43 
CMLR 1277.
14 See Van Bockel, Th e Ne Bis in idem Principle in EU Law (Kluwer, 2010). Cf. Peers, ‘Double Jeopardy 
and EU Law: Time for a Change?’ (2006) 8 Eur. J.L. Reform 199.
15 Fisher v Austria, infra.
16 Among the procedural guarantees aff orded to every accused person in constitutional democracies 
is the principle of ne bis in idem; see Bravo, ‘Ne Bis in Idem as a Defence Right and Procedural 
Safeguard in the EU’ (2011) NJECL 393. Cf. Blackstock, ‘Procedural Safeguards in the European 
Union: A Road Well Travelled?’ (2012) 2 EuCLR 20.
17 Cf. Ambos, ‘Is the Development of a Common Substantive Criminal Law for Europe Possible? Some 
Preliminary Refl ections’ (2005) 12 MJ 173; Hildebrandt, ‘European Criminal Law and European 
Identity’ (2007) 1 Crim. Law and Philos. 57; Vogel, ‘Th e European Integrated Criminal Justice 
System and its Constitutional Framework’ (2005) 12 MJ 125; Leaf, ‘Criminal Law and Fundamental 
Rights in the European Union: Moving Towards Closer Cooperation’ (2003) 3 EHRLR 326.
18 Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the Czech Republic, Article 40(5); Basic Law of the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Article 103(3); Constitution of the Republic of Estonia, Article 23(3); 
Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, Article  31; Constitution of Malta, Article  39(8); 
Constitution of the Portuguese Republic, Article 29(5); Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia, 
Article 31; Constitution of the Slovak Republic, Article 50(5).
19 Th e ne bis in idem principle is a transnational human right; see Vervaele, ‘Th e Transnational Ne Bis 
in Idem Principle in the EU Mutual Recognition and Equivalent Protection of Human Rights’ 
(2005) 1 Utrecht Law Review, 100; Poels, ‘A Need for Transnational Non Bis in Idem Protection in 
International Human Rights Law’ (2005) 23 NQHR 329.
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issue of concurrent claims by prosecutorial jurisdictions over the prosecution of 
transnational crimes has increased the importance of this protection against multiple 
criminal trials and punishments for the same criminal transgression.20
3.2. COMPLEMENTARITY
Th e principle of complementarity pertains to the co-existence of two or more equally 
authoritative systems or sources of law. With regard to EU criminal justice, three key 
conditions necessary to enhance consultation are cooperation and complementarity 
between the European and national criminal jurisdictions, strong political and 
diplomatic will, operational coordination, and development strategy for the recipient 
countries.
Complementarity is the corner stone for the operation of European and international 
criminal justice and coordinates the functional relationship between domestic courts, 
international courts and tribunals, and EU level bodies such as Eurojust.21
Th e principle of ne bis in idem is a corollary of the complementarity principle, 
which prevents an EU or international court or tribunal from asserting jurisdiction 
when a competent national criminal justice system has already tried the defendant. 
Th us, when a domestic court of competent criminal jurisdiction has already tried the 
defendant the complementarity mechanism, refl ected in ne bis in idem, points to a test 
as to whether the national criminal proceedings were genuine.
Key issues pertaining to ne bis in idem in conjunction with complementarity 
include the problem of defi ning the substance of the guarantee, the scope and 
application of the procedural defence, mechanisms for coordinating the allocation of 
cases between Member State authorities and the mediation role of Eurojust, enhanced 
cooperation between States in criminal matters, extraterritoriality of national 
criminal justice systems and convergence issues.22
4. EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Th e protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms is enshrined in the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its 
Protocols. While the ECtHR, has observed that its jurisprudence on the principle of 
ne bis in idem is ‘relatively sparse’,23 the Court has pronounced on the scope and 
application of the principle.
20 Commission Green Paper, ‘Confl icts of Jurisdiction and the Principle of Ne Bis in Idem in Criminal 
Proceedings’ (COM(2005) 696); Commission Staff  Working Document, ‘Annex to the Green Paper 
On Confl icts of Jurisdiction and the Principle of Ne Bis in Idem in Criminal Proceedings’ (SEC(2005) 
1767).
21 Cf. Suominen, ‘Th e Past, Present and the Future of Eurojust’ (2008) 15 MJ 217.
22 See Gebbie, ‘Confl ict of European Jurisdiction: A Matter of Concurrence’ (2009) NJECL 11.
23 Göktan v France [2002] ECHR 33402/96, at para. 44.
Resolving Confl icts of Jurisdiction in Criminal Proceedings
New Journal of European Criminal Law, Vol. 4, Issue 1–2, 2013 65
4.1. SCOPE OF PROTECTION AND APPLICABILITY OF ARTICLE 6
Article 6(1) guarantees the right to an expeditious criminal trial by an independent 
and impartial tribunal. Th e ECtHR has identifi ed fundamental procedural rights in 
accordance with this provision.24 In X v Th e Netherlands,25 the ECtHR considered the 
scope of Article 6(1) and inferred a procedural right against multiple trials for the same 
crime. However, this ruling was somewhat tenuous and subsequently overruled in S v 
Federal Republic of Germany26 where the ECtHR declared that Article 6(1) ‘neither 
expressly nor by way of implication [provides for] the principle of ne bis in idem’.27
4.2. SEVENTH PROTOCOL
Protocol No. 7 to the ECHR is designed to take further steps to ensure the collective 
enforcement of certain rights and freedom.28 Article 4(1) provides:
‘No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings under the 
jurisdiction of the same state for an off ence for which he has already been fi nally acquitted 
or convicted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of that state.’29 (emphasis 
added)
Since the provision refers to these two distinct prohibitions, this suggests that the two 
prohibitions form diff erent aspects of the ne bis in idem principle. Indeed, the ECtHR 
has clearly distinguished between the prohibitions on double prosecution and double 
punishment, and its jurisprudence has developed a threefold distinction namely, the 
right not to be liable to be retried, the right not to be retried, and the right against 
multiple punishments for the same crime.30
In order to successfully raise the procedural defence, the defendant must have 
been fi nally acquitted or convicted for the same, or substantially the same crime 
following a trial on the merits by a court of competent criminal jurisdiction. In Nikitin 
24 In Golder v United Kingdom (1975) 1 EHRR 524, the ECtHR inferred a fundamental right of access 
to the courts in accordance with the provisions of Article 6(1). See Blom-Cooper, ‘Article 6 and 
Modes of Criminal Trial’ (2001) 1 EHRLR 1; Mahoney, ‘Right to a Fair Trial in Criminal Matters 
under Article 6 ECHR’ (2004) 4 Judicial Studies Institute Journal, 107.
25 (1981) 27 DR 233.
26 (1983) 39 DR 43.
27 Ibid. at 47.
28 Emmerson, Ashworth, and Macdonald, Human Rights and Criminal Justice (2nd ed., Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, 2007), p. 423 note that Protocol No. 7 is designed ‘to bring the Convention into 
line with the broader range of rights protected under the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights’.
29 In Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij (LVM) v Commission [2002] ECR I-8375 at para. 59, the ECJ 
observed: ‘the principle of non bis in idem … is a fundamental principle of Community law also 
enshrined in Article 4(1) of Protocol No 7 to the ECHR …’.
30 Th is threefold distinction was upheld in Zolotukhin, infra.
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v Russia,31 the applicant claimed that supervisory review proceedings conducted aft er 
his fi nal acquittal constituted a violation of his right not to be tried again in criminal 
proceedings for a crime of which he had been fi nally acquitted. Th e prosecution 
authorities contended that the applicant was at least liable to be tried again on the 
same counts. Th e ECtHR stated:
‘… the protection against duplication of criminal proceedings is one of the specifi c safeguards 
associated with the general guarantee of a fair hearing in criminal proceedings … [T]he aim 
of art 4 of Protocol No 7 is to prohibit the repetition of criminal proceedings that have been 
concluded by a fi nal decision…Th e Court further notes that the repetitive aspect of trial or 
punishment is central to the legal problem addressed by art 4 of Protocol No 7.’
Th e ECtHR observed that the applicant was not ‘tried again’ and was not liable to be 
‘tried’ twice; the supervisory review could be considered a re-opening of a fi nally 
decided criminal case (on the grounds of new or newly discovered evidence or a 
fundamental defect) that was in accordance with Article 4(1).
In Gradinger v Austria,32 the ECtHR found a violation of the non bis in idem 
principle because in a penal order concerning the applicant an administrative 
authority determined a specifi c blood alcohol concentration as given while in the 
antecedent litigation the criminal court did not. According to the ECtHR both legal 
norms varied in their character, purpose and description of the crime, but both 
controversial decisions were based on the same conduct. Th e ECtHR noted:
‘… the aim of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 is to prohibit the repetition of criminal proceedings 
that have been concluded by a fi nal decision. Th at provision does not therefore apply before 
new proceedings have been opened.’33
Th e Explanatory Report to Protocol 7 stipulates that a verdict will not be fi nal 
unless:
‘… it has acquired the force of res judicata. Th is is the case when it is irrevocable, that is to 
say when no further ordinary remedies are available or when the parties have exhausted 
such remedies or have permitted the time limit to expire without availing themselves of 
them.’34
Th e applicability of the res judicata principle is dependent on the following criteria: 
the domestic laws and procedure of a signatory state do not provide for an appeal in 
specifi ed circumstances; the appellate process has been satisfi ed; and the deadline for 
appeals specifi ed by domestic legislation has expired.
31 [2004] ECHR 50178/99, para. 35.
32 [1995] ECHR 15963/90.
33 Ibid. at para 53.
34 Protocol No. 7 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Explanatory Report, para. 22.
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A fi nal verdict of acquittal or conviction is an essential prerequisite to invoke ne 
bis in idem as a procedural defence against a second prosecution for the same, or 
substantially the same, crime. Consequently, if the former criminal trial had been 
terminated before verdict, there is no legal impediment per se against retrials for the 
same criminal off ence. Typically, this would occur in the case where the prosecution 
enters a nolle prosequi or in circumstances where a mistrial is declared. Article 3, para. 
22, of the explanatory report to Protocol No. 7, which refers to the Explanatory Report 
of the European Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgments,35 
provides that:
‘… a decision is fi nal “if, according to the traditional expression, it has acquired the force of 
res judicata. Th is is the case when it is irrevocable, that is to say when no further ordinary 
remedies are available or when the parties have exhausted such remedies or have permitted 
the time-limit to expire without availing themselves of them”. It follows therefore that a 
judgment by default is not considered as fi nal as long as the domestic law allows the 
proceedings to be taken up again. Likewise, this article does not apply in cases where the 
charge is dismissed or the accused person is acquitted either by the court of fi rst instance 
or, on appeal, by a higher tribunal.  If, however, in one of the States in which such a 
possibility is provided for, the person has been granted leave to appeal aft er the normal 
time of appealing has expired, and his conviction is then reversed on appeal, then subject 
to the other conditions of the article … the article may apply.’
Th e application and scope of Article 4(1) is confi ned to the jurisdiction of the same 
signatory state, and therefore is not applicable between states inter se. Th e principle is 
applicable only in accordance with the law and penal procedure of the same state, 
consequently there is no legal impediment against a second prosecution in another 
Member State for what is essentially the same crime. Th e Explanatory Report to 
Protocol No. 7, at para. 27, states:
‘Th e words “under the jurisdiction of the same State” limit the application of the article to 
the national level. Several other Council of Europe conventions, including the European 
Convention on Extradition (1957), the European Convention on the International Validity 
of Criminal Judgments (1970) and the European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings 
in Criminal Matters (1972), govern the application of the principle at international level.’
Th is commentary considered that the interstate application of ne bis in idem is 
adequately provided for by other international instruments. However, these conventions 
are more concerned with procedural inter-state cooperation in the prosecution of 
off ences extradition and related matters, rather than the substantive protection against 
a prosecution of a defendant who is already within the jurisdiction of the prosecuting 
state or where extradition is sought. Th ese instruments are directly applicable to the 
prevention of multiple prosecutions for the same crime. Th ey are, however, limited to 
35 Council of Europe (European Treaty Series – No. 70), Th e Hague, 28.V.1970, Article 1(a).
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inter state cooperation pertaining to the procedures governing the prosecution of 
crimes that extend beyond the jurisdiction of one state. Consequently, they are restricted 
to procedural issues as opposed to providing for a procedural defence against repeated 
criminal trials in more than one state for substantially the same criminal off ence.
Th e ne bis in idem principle is a legal protection against multiple prosecutions for 
the same criminal off ence, which inevitably gives rise to jurisdiction confl icts in 
determining the issue of sameness of criminal off ences. Th is is further exasperated in 
view of the diversity of national criminal laws. A single criminal episode, or 
transaction, may involve the commission of multiple crimes. In Gradinger v Austria,36 
the ECtHR determined that as the defendant had been punished twice in separate 
proceedings for the same crime, namely causing death by negligent driving while 
under the infl uence of intoxication, this infringed Article  4(1). Gradinger was 
distinguished in Oliveira v Switzerland,37 where Article  4(1) was not infringed 
notwithstanding the fact that a single criminal act was deemed to have constituted 
two off ences and separate prosecutions ensued for each off ence. Th e ECtHR explained 
that a defendant’s criminal act might constitute more than one off ence and 
consequently a separate prosecution for each off ence may proceed without violating 
the principle of ne bis in idem:
‘Th at is a typical example of a single act constituting various off ences…Th e characteristic 
feature of this notion is that a single criminal act is split up into two separate off ences, in 
this case the failure to control the vehicle and the negligent causing of physical injury. In 
such cases, the greater penalty will usually absorb the lesser one. Th ere is nothing in that 
situation which infringes Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 since that provision prohibits people 
being tried twice for the same off ence whereas in cases concerning a single act constituting 
various off ences … one criminal act constitutes two separate off ences.’38
Th e ECtHR also considered whether multiple prosecutions and punishments imposed 
were cumulative in eff ect, and as they were not, the applicant’s right under Article 4(1) 
had not been infringed:
‘… Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 … does not preclude separate off ences, even if they are all 
part of a single criminal act, being tried by diff erent courts, especially where, as in the 
present case, the penalties were not cumulative, the lesser being absorbed by the greater.’39
Th e ECtHR diff erentiated Oliveira and Gradinger, and concluded that in Gradinger 
‘two diff erent courts came to inconsistent fi ndings on the applicant’s blood alcohol 
level.’40
36 [1995] ECHR 15963/90.
37 [1998] ECHR 25711/94.
38 [1998] ECHR 25711/94, at para. 26.
39 [1998] ECHR 25711/94, at para. 27.
40 [1998] ECHR 25711/94, at para. 28.
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In Oliveira, the ECtHR found that one single act fulfi lled the defi nition of multiple 
criminal off ences, whereas the heavier penalty absorbed the lesser off ence. In the 
absence of repeated prosecution of the same crime, the ECtHR found no violation of 
Article  4 given. Th e repetitive aspect of trial or punishment is central to the legal 
problem addressed by Article 4. Th e fact that the penalties in the two sets of proceedings 
were not cumulative was relevant to the fi nding that there was no violation of the 
provision where two sets of proceedings were brought in respect of a single act.
Th e same crime dilemma was also under consideration in Fischer v Austria,41 
where the ECtHR had to determine if two convictions based on the same criminal 
transaction violated Article 4(1). Th e applicant caused a lethal traffi  c accident while 
driving intoxicated and subsequently absconded. Initially he received an 
administrative penalty for drunk driving and subsequently was convicted by the 
criminal court for involuntary manslaughter. According to the ECtHR, Article 4 had 
been violated because the adopted legal norms did not enough vary in their essential 
elements:
‘… the wording of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 does not refer to ‘the same off ence’ but rather 
to trial and punishment ‘again’ for an off ence for which the applicant has already been 
fi nally acquitted or convicted. Th us, while it is true that the mere fact that a single act 
constitutes more than one off ence is not contrary to this Article, the Court must not limit 
itself to fi nding that an applicant was, because of one act, tried or punished for nominally 
diff erent off ences. Th e Court…notes that there are cases where one act, at fi rst sight, 
appears to constitute more than one off ence, whereas a closer examination shows that only 
one off ence should be prosecuted because it encompasses all the wrongs contained in the 
others … An obvious example would be an act which constitutes two off ences, one of 
which contains precisely the same elements as the other plus an additional one. Th ere may 
be other cases where the off ences only slightly overlap. Th us, where diff erent off ences based 
on one act are prosecuted consecutively, one aft er the fi nal decision of the other, the Court 
has to examine whether or not such off ences have the same essential elements.’42
An indictment for the same criminal off ence is key to the application of ne bis in idem, 
and this requirement could be determined in accordance with the law and penal 
procedure of signatory states. However, the interstate application of ne bis in idem 
raises procedural dilemmas in the determination of this issue as the elements of 
crimes with diff ers with each state’s penal laws.43
In Zolotukhin v. Russia,44 the Grand Chamber marked a clear departure from the 
previous case law of the ECtHR and the Court seems to have followed the case law of 
the ECJ pertaining to Article 54 CISA by adopting a broad and objective approach to 
41 [2001] ECHR 37950/97.
42 Ibid. at para. 35. See also WF v Austria [2002] ECHR 38275/97; Sailer v Austria [2002] ECHR 38237/97.
43 Weyembergh, ‘Th e Functions of Approximation of Penal Legislation within the European Union’ 
(2005) 12 MJ 149.
44 Application No. 14939/03.
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the interpretation of the same crime element in the protection under in Article 4. A 
Russian national rampaged inside a police station and received an administrative 
penalty for insulting a public offi  cial as well as a criminal conviction for civil disorder. 
Th e ECtHR found that the defendant’s rights under Article 4 had been violated. In a 
review of its previous case law, the ECtHR found three approaches pertaining to the 
dilemma of resolving the same off ence dilemma. Th e fi rst approach focuses on the 
‘same conduct’ on the applicant’s part irrespective of its classifi cation in law.45 Th e 
second emanates from this intention but posits that the same conduct may constitute 
several crimes that may be tried in separate proceedings.46 A third approach puts the 
emphasis on the ‘essential elements’ of the two off ences.47 For the reason of legal 
certainty, the ECtHR found it necessary to harmonise these approaches. Th e Court 
initially followed the ECJ and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, both of 
which found that an analysis of the international instruments incorporating the non 
bis in idem principle in one or another form would reveal the variety of terms in which 
it is couched and suggested an approach solely based on the material acts irrespective 
their legally qualifi cation. According to the ECtHR an approach focusing on the legal 
classifi cation of two crimes would be too restrictive for individual rights. Th e ECtHR 
noted that the ECHR is a ‘living instrument’ and should be interpreted in terms of 
practicality and eff ectiveness in addition to the object and purpose of its provisions. 
Th erefore, Article 4 prohibits the prosecution or punishment for a second off ence if 
the elements of facts in both proceedings are either identical or essentially the same.
In Oliveira, the ECtHR declared that the crimes and not the actual conduct are 
decisive. Th e decision in Fischer was a continued renunciation from the case law of 
Gradinger. Further, in Asci v Austria,48 the ECtHR emphasised the need to determine 
‘same essential elements’. Th e ECtHR refi ned this doctrine and determined it more 
precisely in Zolotukhin so that the established legal certainty allowed implementing 
the case law of the ECtHR especially in accordance with the basic principle of the 
separation of powers.
Article 4(1) is concerned with the prevention of multiple prosecutions for the same 
crime, but this provision would not preclude separate proceedings based on the same 
criminal transgression. Typically, these would include civil proceedings to recover 
criminal assets or the proceeds of crime. In Ponsetti and Chesnel v France,49 the 
ECtHR determined that where the national tax authorities imposed a fi ne, Article 4(1) 
was not deemed to have been infringed where a court of competent criminal 
jurisdiction subsequently imposed punishment.
45 Gradinger v Austria, op.cit.
46 Oliveira v Switzerland; Gauthier v France (Application No. 4483/02); Öngün v Turkey (Application 
No. 15737/02).
47 Fischer v Austria, op.cit. Sailer v Austria, op.cit., fn. 41.
48 Application No. 4483/02.
49 Application Nos. 36855/97 and 41731/98.
Resolving Confl icts of Jurisdiction in Criminal Proceedings
New Journal of European Criminal Law, Vol. 4, Issue 1–2, 2013 71
Protection against a second prosecution is not absolute however, and may be 
circumvented where the criminal law and procedure of a signatory state provides for 
a legal mechanism to re-prosecute in the light of fresh and compelling evidence of 
guilt, or tainted acquittal. Article 4(2) states:
‘Th e provision of the preceding paragraph [Article 4(1)] shall not prevent the reopening of 
the case in accordance with the law and penal procedure of the State concerned, if there is 
new or newly discovered facts, or there has been a fundamental defect in the proceedings, 
which could aff ect the outcome of the case’.
Consequently, where fresh and compelling evidence of the defendant’s guilt is 
discovered following an acquittal then a re-prosecution may proceed in accordance 
with the domestic law of the signatory state.
Th e criminal law and procedure of signatory states may also permit the re-opening 
of a criminal trial in circumstances where the fi rst trial had been tainted due to 
witness or jury intimidation or where the trial court is declared a corum non judice. In 
Nikitin v Russia,50 the ECtHR stated:
‘… Article 4 of Protocol No 7 draws a clear distinction between a second prosecution or 
trial which is prohibited by the fi rst paragraph of this Article, and the resumption of a trial 
in exceptional circumstances, which is provided for in its second paragraph. Article 4(2) of 
Protocol No 7 expressly envisages the possibility that an individual may have to accept, in 
accordance with domestic law, prosecution on the same counts where a case is re-opened 
following the emergence of new evidence or the discovery of a fundamental defect in the 
previous proceedings.’51
Whether the exceptions to ne bis in idem would have the eff ect of narrowing the 
procedural defence is unlikely.
Th e ne bis in idem principle is augmented by virtue of Article 4(3) of Protocol 7, 
which provides that ‘No derogation from this Article shall be made under Article 15 
of the Convention’.
4.3. CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
Th e principle of ne bis in idem only relates to a right not to be tried twice in criminal 
proceedings. However, the term criminal is given an autonomous meaning under the 
Convention and includes particular competition and administrative proceedings.52 
Th e principle is violated not only when a defendant is prosecuted and convicted for 
the same crime but also if the defendant is tried and convicted for two nominally 
50 [2004] ECHR 50178/99.
51 Ibid. at para. 45.
52 See Wils, ‘Th e Principle of Ne Bis in Idem in EC Antitrust Enforcement: A Legal and Economic 
Analysis’ (2003) 26 World Competition, 131.
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diff erent crimes that have the same essential elements.53 Multiple prosecutions in 
addition to multiple punishments are prohibited therefore a prosecuting state cannot 
stay within the scope of the protection by simply reducing the amount of the second 
punishment by the amount of the fi rst.54
5. INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND 
POLITICAL RIGHTS
Th e fundamental rights protected by the ICCPR are broadly similar to the ECHR. Th e 
ICCPR and its First Optional Protocol make provision for applicants to petition the 
Human Rights Committee to investigate complaints pertaining to alleged violations 
of the ICCPR’s provisions.55 Signatory states are obliged to put in place the necessary 
procedures in order to comply with the Covenant.56 Th e Committee determines 
applications for alleged violations of its provisions but, that body is not empowered to 
make binding decisions on state parties.57 Despite this defi ciency, signatory states 
may consider the provisions of the ICCPR as persuasive authority in the domestic 
courts.
Article 14(7) provides:
‘No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an off ence for which he has already 
been fi nally convicted or acquitted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of each 
country.’ (emphasis added)
Th e stipulation that there has been a fi nal verdict of acquittal or conviction in 
accordance with the domestic criminal law and procedure of signatory states is a 
fundamental prerequisite. In Schweizer v Uruguay,58 the Committee noted that 
Article 14(7) ‘… is only violated if a person is tried again for an off ence for which he 
has been fi nally convicted or acquitted.’ In Jijón v Ecuador,59 the Committee stated:
53 Fisher v Austria, op cit., at para 25.
54 Ibid. at para. 30.
55 Article 2 of the First Optional Protocol inter alia provides ‘… individuals who claim that any of their 
rights enumerated in the Covenant have been violated and who have exhausted all available 
domestic remedies may submit a written communication to the Committee for consideration’.
56 Article 40.1 provides that ‘Th e States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to submit reports 
on the measures they have adopted which give eff ect to the rights recognized herein and on the 
progress made in the enjoyment of those rights.’
57 See McGoldrick, Th e Human Rights Committee: It’s Role in the Development of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 151, para. 4.39 stating: ‘It is clear 
from the draft ing work that the views of the HRC do not constitute a legally binding decision as 
regards the State party concerned.’
58 (Communication No. 66/1980), at para. 18.2.
59 (Communication No. 277/1988), at para. 5.4.
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‘… article 14, paragraph 7, proscribes re-trial or punishment for an off ence for which the 
person has already been convicted or acquitted. In the instant case, while the second 
indictment concerned a specifi c element of the same matter examined in the initial trial, 
[the defendant] was not tried or convicted a second time, since the Superior Court quashed 
the indictment, thus vindicating the principle of ne bis in idem. Accordingly, the 
Committee fi nds that there has been no violation of article  14, paragraph 7, of the 
Covenant.’
Crimes must be the same in both fact and law, that is, a factual and legal nexus. 
Moreover, the crime charged must accord with the penal law of the signatory state 
concerned.
Article 14(7) is applicable only to crimes and not to disciplinary measures that do 
not constitute a sanction for a crime within the meaning of this provision. In Strik v 
Th e Netherlands,60 the Committee stated:
‘With regard to the author’s claims that he was punished several times for the same act, in 
decisions of 25 September 1990, 5 January and 8 June 1993 by his employer, that this was 
not repaired in spite of the Central Board of Appeal’s ruling in his favour, and that the 
Central Board of Appeal by combining the penalty of resignation with other penalties, 
imposed a heavier penalty on him, than the one that was applicable at the time of the 
criminal off ence, in violation of articles 14, paragraphs 6 and 7, and 15 of the Covenant, the 
Committee notes that these articles of the Covenant relate to criminal off ences, whereas in 
the author’s case only disciplinary measures were imposed and the material before the 
Committee does not show that the imposition of these measures related to a ‘criminal 
charge’ or a ‘criminal off ence’ in the meaning of article 14 or 15 of the Covenant.’
Th e Committee determined that only disciplinary measures were imposed on the 
author and that the imposition of these measures did not relate to a ‘criminal charge’ 
or a ‘criminal off ence’ within the meaning of Article 14 or 15 of the Covenant.
In contrast with Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the ECHR, Article 14(7) ICCPR does 
not expressly provide for the re-opening of a criminal trial in the light of new evidence 
of the defendant’s guilt or where the former criminal trial was tainted. In response to 
this lacuna, reservations were submitted by many states parties, which resulted in the 
Committee issuing a declaratory statement pertaining to the application and scope of 
this provision:
‘In considering State reports diff ering views have oft en been expressed as to the scope of 
paragraph 7 of article 14. Some States parties have even felt the need to make reservations 
in relation to procedures for the resumption of criminal cases. It seems to the Committee 
that most States parties make a clear distinction between a resumption of a trial justifi ed 
60 (Communication No. 1001/2001), at para. 7.3.
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by exceptional circumstances and a re-trial prohibited pursuant to the principle of ne bis in 
idem as contained in paragraph 7. Th is understanding of the meaning of ne bis in idem may 
encourage States parties to reconsider their reservations to article 14, paragraph 7.’61
Th is would accord with Article 4(2) of Protocol 7, which stipulates for the re-opening 
of criminal proceedings in circumstances where fresh evidence of guilt is subsequently 
discovered, or if the former criminal trial was in defective or the acquittal was 
tainted.
Th e defi ciency in the scope and application of Article 14(7) lies in the fact that it is 
only applicable ‘in accordance with the law and penal procedure of each country’ that 
is within the jurisdiction of the same signatory state. Consequently, it is not applicable 
between states inter se. Th is issue was considered in AP v Italy,62 where the Committee 
declared that Article 14(7) operates to prevent the multiplicity of criminal trials and 
punishments for the same off ence:
‘… since article 14, paragraph 7, of the Covenant…does not guarantee non bis in idem with 
regard to the national jurisdictions of two or more states. Th e Committee observes that this 
provision prohibits double jeopardy only with regard to an off ence adjudicated in a given 
State’.63
Th e lacuna might be circumvented where Member States of the EU are signatories to 
international conventions, or provisions thereof, pertaining to the application of the 
principle of ne bis in idem between states inter se.64
6. CONVENTION IMPLEMENTING THE SCHENGEN 
AGREEMENT
Th e ne bis in idem principle raises a number of questions of interpretation because of 
the divergent rules of evidence, procedure and elements of crimes applying nationally 
and internationally. In the legal systems of some Member States, the principle is 
applied only in the national context, that is, vertically in the country’s domestic 
61 United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment 13 (Equality before the Courts and 
the Right to a Fair and Public Hearing by an Independent Court Established by Law), para. 19.
62 AP v Italy (Communication No. 204/1986).
63 AP v Italy (Communication No. 204/1986), at para. 7.3. See also AR J v Australia (Communication 
No. 692/1996), at para. 6.4.
64 European Communities Convention on Double Jeopardy of 1987; Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union, Article  50; Convention implementing Schengen Agreement, Article  54; 
European Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgments 1970, Articles 53–55; 
European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters 1972, Articles 35–37; the 
latter two conventions were precursors to the inclusion of the principle of ne bis in idem in the 
Schengen Accord.
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criminal procedure. Articles 54 to 58 CISA65 are devoted to the ne bis in idem principle 
to apply in the international context, that is, horizontally.66
Th e absence of inter-state application in the scope of the ne bis in idem principle as 
provided for by the ECHR and the ICCPR pertains to the non-application of the 
protection between states inter se. Consequently, a defendant could potentially be 
prosecuted, convicted and punished by more than one state for what is essentially the 
same crime. Th is defi ciency is somewhat circumvented by Article 54 CISA:
‘A person whose trial has been fi nally disposed of in one Contracting Party may not be 
prosecuted in another Contracting Party for the same acts provided that, if a penalty has 
been imposed, it has been enforced, is actually in the process of being enforced or can no 
longer be enforced under the laws of the sentencing Contracting Party.’67 (emphasis 
added)
On fi rst reading, the scope of Article 54 seems narrow in that it only seems applicable 
to a defendant who had already been subject to a criminal trial.  It seems to be a 
prohibition only against multiple trials, which in itself is not absolute in that a person 
could still be prosecuted if the penalty had been waived. However, this seemingly 
narrow interpretation was rejected in Gözütok and Brügge,68 where the ECJ gave its 
fi rst ruling on the interpretation of CISA. Gözütok owned a coff ee shop in Th e 
Netherlands and was charged with being in possession of large amounts of marijuana. 
He entered into a plea agreement with the Dutch prosecution authorities under which 
in return for making a fi nancial settlement the criminal charges were dropped. Brügge 
was charged with assault and wounding by the Belgian authorities and the criminal 
charges were dropped in return for making an out of court settlement. Gözütok and 
65 Th e Schengen Agreement was integrated to the framework of the EU with the Treaty of Amsterdam 
by the Schengen Protocol, and stipulates that Contracting Parties give formal recognition to fi nal 
judgments in another jurisdiction to facilitate the implementation of the ne bis in idem principle. Cf. 
Th ym, ‘Th e Schengen Law: A Challenge for Legal Accountability in the European Union’ (2002) 8 
ELJ 218.
66 While Ireland and the United Kingdom are not parties to the Schengen Agreement, they can, with 
the approval of the EU Council, apply the Schengen acquis in whole or in part and participate in its 
further development. Ireland and the United Kingdom have applied to take part only in the police 
and criminal judicial co-operation measures and not the common border control and visa 
provisions. See Commission Staff  Working Document: Annex to the Green Paper on ‘Confl icts of 
Jurisdiction and the Principle of Ne Bis In Idem in Criminal Proceedings’ SEC(2005) 1767, p. 45.
67 See Loof, ‘54 CISA and the Principles of Ne Bis in Idem’ (2007) 15 EurJCrimeCrLCrJ 309.
68 Criminal proceedings against Hüseyin Gözütok (C-187/01) and Klaus Brügge (C-385/01) 
(Judgment 11 February 2003) [2003] ECR I-1345. See Wasmeier and Th waites, ‘Th e Development 
of Ne Bis In Idem into a Transnational Fundamental Right in EU Law: Comments on Recent 
Developments’ (2006) 31 ELR 565; Fletcher, ‘Some Developments to the Ne Bis in Idem Principle 
in the European Union: Criminal Proceedings against Huseyn Gözütok and Klaus Brügge’ (2003) 
66 MLR 769; Th waites, ‘Mutual Trust in Criminal Matters: the ECJ gives a First Interpretation of 
a Provision of the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement’ (2003) 4 German Law 
Journal, 253; Tchorbadjiyska, ‘Joint Cases C-187/01 and C-385/01 Gözütok and Brügge’ (2004) 10 
Colum. J. Eur. L. 549.
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Brügge subsequently went to Germany and were charged with the off ences, the 
German prosecution authorities argued that they were not bound by Article  54 as 
both cases had not been disposed of by a court but rather discontinued by the 
prosecution authorities. Th e judgment was rendered aft er the national courts of 
Belgium and Germany requested a preliminary ruling interpreting Article 54. In both 
cases, the proceedings already brought against the two defendants had been defi nitively 
discontinued by prosecutors in other Member States. Th e ECJ also stated that a 
necessary implication of the principle is that the Member States have mutual trust in 
their criminal justice systems and that each recognises the criminal law of other 
Member States even when the outcome would be diff erent if its own national law were 
applied. Th is represents considerable progress over Protocol 7 to the ECHR.69 Th e 
judgment is clearly centred around securing free movement of persons.70
In Miraglia,71 the ECJ held that Article 54, the purpose of which is to ensure that 
no defendant is prosecuted on the same facts in several Member States on account of 
having exercised the right to free movement, is not applicable to a decision of the 
judicial authorities in one Member State declaring a case closed if the prosecution 
authorities did not initiate a prosecution on the sole ground that criminal proceedings 
have commenced in another Member State against the defendant for the same acts. 
Such a decision will not constitute a decision fi nally disposing of the case within the 
meaning of Article 54. Th e consequence of applying the principle of ne bis in idem to 
a decision to close criminal proceedings would render it virtually impossible to 
penalise in the Member State concerned the defendant’s unlawful conduct.
7. CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
Th e Charter of Fundamental Rights sets out in a single text the range of civil, political, 
economic and social rights of European citizens and all persons resident in the EU.72 
Th e ne bis in idem principle is enshrined in Article 50, which extends the principle 
throughout Union territory:73
69 ECJ jurispriudence on Article 54 require that Contracting Parties should recognise the criminal 
laws in force in other Member States even when the outcome would be diff erent if its own national 
law had been applied. R v Gözütok and Brügge [2003] CMLR 2; Van Esbroeck [2006] 3 CMLR 6 at 
para. 30. Cf. Van Esbroeck C-436/04; Van Straaten C-150/05; Gasparini C-467/04; Kretzinder 
C-288/05; Kraaijenbrink C-367/05; Bourquain C-297/07; Turansky C-491/07; Mantello C-261/09.
70 Joined Cases C-187/01 and C-385/01S, at paras. 36–39.
71 C-469/03.
72 Th e Charter became binding with entry into force of the tready of Lisbon. See Di Federico (ed.), Th e 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: From Declaration to Binding Instrument (Springer, 2011); Peers 
and Ward (eds.), Th e EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: Politics, Law and Policy (Hart, 2004).
73 Cf. Burchard and Brodowski, ‘Th e Post-Lisbon Principle of Transnational Ne Bis in Idem: On the 
Relationship between Article  50 Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article  54 Convention 
Implementing the Schengen Agreement. Case note on District Court Aachen, Germany, (52 Ks 9/08 
– Boere), Decision of 8 December 2010’ (2010) NJECL 310.
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‘No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings for an off ence 
for which he or she has already been fi nally acquitted or convicted within the Union in 
accordance with the law.’ (emphasis added)
Th is provision is intended to have similar eff ect as Article 4 of Protocol 7 to the ECHR 
but is broader in scope to the extent that it operates ‘between the Courts of the Member 
States’.74
While international treaties establish this guarantee within national borders, 
Article 50 applies to the national level and in accordance with the legal rights of the 
EU, between the jurisdictions of several Member States
8. LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK
Th e Council Framework Decision on Prevention and Settlement of Confl icts of Exercise 
of Jurisdiction in Criminal Proceedings75 aims to prevent situations where a defendant is 
subject to parallel criminal proceedings in several Member States in respect of the same 
facts. It aims to prevent an infringement of ne bis in idem as set out in Article 54 CISA.
Th e Framework Decision has the objective of establishing a system of free 
movement of judicial decisions in criminal matters within an area of freedom, security 
and justice, and the mutual recognition of judicial decisions between Member States.76 
It establishes the framework for Member States to exchange information and enter 
into direct consultations.
It lays out the procedure whereby competent national authorities shall contact each 
other when they have reasonable grounds to believe that parallel proceedings are being 
conducted in another Member State. It also establishes the framework for these authorities 
to enter into direct consultations when parallel proceedings exist, in order to fi nd a 
solution aimed at avoiding the negative consequences arising from these proceedings.
8.1. EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION
If the competent authority of a Member State has reasonable grounds to believe that 
parallel proceedings are ongoing in another State, it must seek confi rmation on the 
74 See Council of the EU, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union: Explanations Relating 
to the Complete Text of the Charter, December 2000, pp. 69, 76.
75 Framework Decision 2009/948/JHA. OJ L 328, 15.12.2009. Cf. Hinarejos, ‘On the Legal Eff ects of 
Framework Decisions and Decisions: Directly Applicable, Directly Eff ective, Self-executing, 
Supreme?’ (2008) 14 ELJ 620.
76 See Taupiac-Nouvel, ‘Th e Principle of Mutual Recognition in Criminal Matters: A New Model for 
Judicial Cooperation within the European Union’ (2012) 2 EuCLR 236. Cf. Bassiouni, ‘Human 
Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying International Procedural Protections and 
Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions’ (1993) 3 Duke Journal of Comparative and 
International Law, 247; Paridaens, ‘Negative Eff ects of Foreign Criminal Judgments in Europe’ 
(1988) 6 NQHR 35.
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existence of such parallel proceedings from the competent authority of that State. Th e 
contacted authority must reply without undue delay or within the deadline set by the 
contacting authority.
Th e contacted authority must indicate whether criminal proceedings are or have 
been conducted in its country concerning some or all of the same facts and the same 
defendants as those in the criminal proceedings in the country of the contacting 
authority.
8.2. DIRECT CONSULTATIONS
In the case of parallel proceedings, the relevant authorities shall enter into direct 
consultations with the aim of resolving the dilemma. Th e relevant authorities must 
consider all the facts and merits of and all other relevant factors pertaining to the case. 
If no solution is found, the case shall be referred to Eurojust if appropriate and 
provided that the off ences and circumstance falls under its competence.
In cross-border cases involving several jurisdictions, the best practice is for 
prosecutors and investigators to consider and balance the diff erent factors that should 
be considered when reaching a decision where to prosecute, including: whether the 
prosecution can be divided into separate cases in two or more jurisdiction; the location 
and interests of the victim or victims; the location and interests of witnesses; the 
location and interests of the accused; eff ect of delays.
8.3. EUROJUST TO MEDIATE IN CASES THAT SEEM TO BE 
DEADLOCKED
Th e Eurojust Annual Report 2003 produced some guidelines that prosecutors can 
refer to when considering such issues, which may also be used when dealing with 
non-EU Member States.77
Th ere should be a preliminary presumption that a prosecution should take place 
in the jurisdiction where the majority of the criminality occurred or where the 
majority of the loss was sustained. Prosecutors should balance carefully and fairly all 
the factors for and against commencing a prosecution in each jurisdiction where it is 
possible to do so. Some of the factors, which should be considered, are:
– Location of the accused: the possibility of a prosecution in that jurisdiction and 
whether extradition proceedings or transfers of proceedings are possible.
– Extradition and surrender of persons: the capacity of the competent authorities in 
one jurisdiction to extradite or surrender a defendant from another jurisdiction to 
face prosecution in their jurisdiction.
77 Eurojust Guidelines, Annual Report 2003, ‘Making the Decision: Which Jurisdiction Should 
Prosecute?’, www.eurojust.europa.eu/press_annual.htm.
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– Dividing the prosecution into cases in two or more jurisdictions: the investigation 
and prosecution of complex cases of transnational crime will oft en lead to the 
possibility of a number of prosecutions in diff erent jurisdictions.
– Attendance of witnesses: securing a just and fair conviction is a priority for every 
prosecutor. Prosecutors will have to consider the willingness of witnesses both to 
give evidence and, if necessary, to travel to another jurisdiction to give that evidence.
– Protection of witnesses: prosecutors should always seek to ensure that witnesses or 
those who are assisting the prosecution process are not endangered.
– Delay: a maxim recognised in all jurisdictions is that ‘justice delayed is justice 
denied’. Whilst time should not be the leading factor in deciding which jurisdiction 
should prosecute, where other factors are balanced then prosecutors should consider 
the length of time, which proceedings will take to be concluded in a jurisdiction.
– Interests of victims: prosecutors must take into account the interests of victims 
and whether they would be prejudiced if any prosecution were to take place in one 
jurisdiction rather than another.
– Evidential problems: prosecutors can only pursue cases using reliable, credible 
and admissible evidence.
– Legal requirements: prosecutors must not decide to prosecute in one jurisdiction 
rather than another simply to avoid complying with the legal obligations that 
apply in one jurisdiction but not in another.
– Sentencing powers: the relative sentencing powers of courts in the diff erent 
potential prosecution jurisdictions must not be a primary factor in deciding in 
which jurisdiction a case should be prosecuted.
– Proceeds of crime: prosecutors should not decide to prosecute in one jurisdiction 
rather than another only because it would result in the more eff ective recovery of 
the proceeds of crime.
– Resources and costs of prosecuting: the costs of prosecuting a case, or its impact 
on the resources of a prosecution offi  ce, should only be a factor in deciding whether 
a case should be prosecuted in one jurisdiction rather than in another when all 
other factors are equally balanced.
Th e role of Eurojust is to facilitate co-operation in the investigation of cross-border 
crime, particularly transnational organised crime. Where prosecutors cannot reach 
an agreement, the case will be referred to Eurojust, which can be used as a fi nal arbiter.
9. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: LESSONS TO BE 
LEARNED?
In its 2011 report on EU eff orts to support the International Criminal Court, and its 
2012 report on the Annual Report on Human Rights in the World and the European 
Union’s policy on the matter, Parliament emphasised the importance of enhancing 
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the capacity and willingness of national judicial systems to investigate and prosecute 
crimes under the jurisdiction of and in accordance with the principle of 
complementarity enshrined in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
Th e ICC is intended to complement, not to replace, national criminal justice 
systems.78 Paragraph 10 of the Preamble and Article 1 of the Rome Statute defi nes the 
ICC as an international organisation that ‘shall be complementary to national criminal 
jurisdictions.’ Th e ICC does not have primary jurisdiction over national prosecuting 
authorities but rather is subsidiary to and supplements the investigation processes and 
prosecution of off ences within the jurisdiction of the ICC, and should only act when 
national authorities fail to investigate and prosecute off enders.79 Th e principle of 
complementarity is the cornerstone for the operation of the ICC and is the underlying 
theory of international criminal law in the prosecution of human rights violations.
Th e principle of ne bis in idem80 directly aff ects the functioning of international 
criminal justice between States Parties and international criminal law, either 
separately or in conjunction with each other.81 Th e principle governs the functional 
relationship between national courts and the ICC, which is pivotal to the operation of 
international criminal law and prosecution of fundamental human rights violations.82 
Th e signifi cance of the principle is evidenced by the fact that it is not only a principle 
of criminal law and procedure but also one of fundamental human rights.83
Th e process of establishing prosecutorial jurisdiction by the ICC and 
commencement of criminal proceedings is one of the most important aspects of the 
relationship between the ICC and States Parties. Th e principles of complementarity 
and ne bis in idem inevitably will be modifi ed vis-à-vis the principle commonly 
understood under the national law of States Parties. Th e analyses of the principle as 
applied in the Rome Statute has led to the conclusion that the principle of ne bis in 
idem can be understood and applied only in conjunction with the principle of 
complementarity.84
78 See Kleff ner, Complementarity in the Rome Statute and National Criminal Jurisdictions (Oxford 
University Press, 2008); El Zeidy, Th e Principle of Complementarity in International Criminal Law 
(Brill, 2008); El Zeidy, ‘Th e Principle of Complementarity: A New Machinery to Implement 
International Criminal Law’ (2002) 23 Mich. J. Int’ l L. 869; Politi and Gioia, Th e International 
Criminal Court and National Jurisdictions (Ashgate, 2008); Jurdi, Th e International Criminal Court 
and National Courts: A Contentious Relationship (Ashgate, 2011).
79 Article 5.
80 Article 20.
81 Consider the following jurisdictional dilemma: what happens if a state prosecutes for an ‘ordinary 
crime’ such as murder or rape, rather than for an ‘international crime’ such as genocide, crimes 
against humanity, aggression or war crimes?
82 See Conway, ‘Ne Bis in Idem in International Law’ (2003) 3 International Criminal Law Review, 217.
83 ECHR, Protocol 7, Article 4(1) and (2); ICCPR Article 14(7).
84 See Carter, ‘Th e Principle of Complementarily and the International Criminal Court: Th e Role of Ne 
Bis in Idem’ (2010) 8 Santa Clara Journal of International Law, 165.
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Th e issues that arise before the ICC are not generally unique to the jurisdiction of 
that Court and it is always useful to see how cognate jurisdictions view problems. 
While analysis provided and the solutions suggested by jurisprudence of the ICC on 
the principle of ne bis in idem and complementarity will hold their own intrinsic 
interest they may also shed light on similar matters that will inevitably come before 
European courts, tribunals, and EU level bodies (such as Eurojust) pertaining to 
confl icts of jurisdiction.
10. CONCLUSION
National criminal justice systems are realising the challenges of existing within a 
European and international legal framework, and Member States response to all 
forms of transnational crime includes the challenges of combating new emerging 
forms of crime, eff ectiveness of international cooperation in criminal matters and the 
dimensions of the development of the security and justice agenda.
Th e principle of complementarity is based on the rationale that national criminal 
justice systems should have an opportunity to deal with criminal matters adequately 
and eff ectively, and the failure of domestic criminal justice systems to deal with 
transnational crimes opens the door for Eurojust to mediate a case at the international 
instance. Th e principle is relevant to the regulation of European criminal justice as 
there is no universally accepted ne bis in idem provision available at the international 
level, although it is to some extent recognised and respected via Article  54 CISA, 
Article 4 of Protocol 7 to the ECHR and Article 14(7) ICCPR. Th ese provisions are 
applicable only within the jurisdiction of the same state and do not operate to prevent 
multiple trials for substantially the same crime between states. Th is may be explained 
by the generally accepted protocol against human rights instruments imposing a duty 
on signatory states to recognise judgments by criminal courts in other jurisdictions as 
binding in the state where the defendant is purported to be tried for a criminal off ence. 
Th e purpose of the Framework Decision is to address this defi ciency and makes 
provision for a dispute resolution mechanism where confl icts of jurisdiction arise in 
criminal proceedings between several Member States.
Th e obstacles to a single, autonomous and uniformly applicable EU ne bis in idem 
principle include diff erently worded provisions within the respective international 
conventions, a measure of confusion and confl ict within the jurisprudence of 
international courts and tribunals pertaining to the same crime dilemma, and the 
vague possible exceptions specifi ed in Article 55 (derogation from application of the 
ne bis in idem principle) CISA. An overview of the basic terminology and concepts 
used identifi es a clear diff erence between a narrow defi nition that uses ‘off ence’ or 
‘elements’, and a broad defi nition that uses ‘conduct,’ ‘acts,’ or ‘facts.’ Understanding 
the fundamental dilemmas and issues associated with the interpretation and 
application of ne bis in idem principle in conjunction with complementarity 
necessitates developing and refi ning the principle within the EU legal order.
